Psycholegal & Clinical Assessment Services
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Sex Offender Evaluation
Evaluations of Persons Charged with a Sexual Crime
Psycholegal & Clinical Assessment Services offers sex offender evaluations of individuals charged with a sexual crime. Dr. Steven Gaskell has extensive expertise evaluating individuals charged with sexual crimes. Such psychological evaluations typically include a comprehensive review of all available medical, legal, and treatment records, psychosexual testing (e.g., MSI-II), psychological testing including the use of empirically validated actuarial instruments (i.e., Static-99R, MnSOST-R), application of additional empirically based risk and protective factors to sexually reoffend, and a clinical interview. The psychological report outlines the individual’s mental disorder(s), the person’s estimated risk to sexually reoffend (e.g., Low, Moderate or High), sexual deviancy issues, treatment amenability and other recommendations as appropriate.
Dr. Gaskell, forensic psychologist at Psycholegal & Clinical Assessment Services, has completed over 1000 Forensic Psychological Evaluations including more than 500 evaluations of sexual offenders, mostly within the context of Sexually Violent Person or Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) evaluations. He has evaluated sexual offenders both pre-probable cause and post-probable cause. He has testified in approximately 50 Sexually Violent Person or Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) cases and he has testified been an expert witness for both the prosecution and the defense. He has also been deposed on numerous occasions. He has been qualified as an expert in the evaluation of sex offenders and he has given expert testimony in the following Illinois counties: Cook County, Will County, DuPage County, Kane County, Kendall County, Lake County, Winnebago County, Kankakee County, Ogle County, Bureau County, Fulton County, Champaign County, Sangamon County, Madison County, Knox County, Boone County and Jefferson County. He has also provided expert testimony regarding sexual offenders in several counties throughout Kansas. Sex offender evaluations can be completed for several counties in Georgia, including, but not limited to: Fulton County, Gwinnett County, Cobb County, DeKalb County, Clayton County, Rockdale County, Douglas County, Henry County, Forsyth County, Bibb County, Houston County, and Laurens County.
Dr. Gaskell is a Clinical Member of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA) and he is a Registered Evaluator with the Illinois Sex Offender Management Board (SOMB). He also has been qualified as a Sex Offender Risk Assessment Evaluator by the DuPage County Department of Probation and Court Services.
Evaluations of Sexually Violent Persons or Sexually Violent Predators (SVP)
Psycholegal & Clinical Assessment Services has had a contract to conduct post-probable cause Sexually Violent Person evaluations in Illinois. Dr. Gaskell has performed such Sexually Violent Person evaluations in Illinois since 2005 and he continues to do so. He also completed pre-probable cause evaluations for sex offenders in Kansas being considered under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act from 1999 to 2001.
Psycholegal & Clinical Assessment Services accepts referrals for pre-probable cause and post-probable cause Sexually Violent Person and Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations nationwide, with the exception of Illinois. Second opinion evaluations and trial consultation services are also available.
Call us today for a Free Consultation at 630-780-1085 or 404-504-7039.
State Standards for Sexually Violent Persons or Sexually Violent Predators (SVP)
Illinois
In Illinois a Sexually Violent Person is defined in 725 ILCS 207/5 (f) as the following: “Sexually violent person” means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexual violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexual violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.
Kansas
In Kansas, Statute Chapter 59, Article 29a (59-29a02 Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators) defines a Sexually Violent Predator as:
(a) “Sexually violent predator” means any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.
(b) “Mental abnormality” means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.
(c) “Likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence” means the person’s propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others.
Iowa
In Iowa, Code 229 (229A.2) -Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, defines a Sexually Violent Predator as: “a person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility.”
Missouri
In Missouri, Section 632.480 defines a “Sexually Violent Predator” as “any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility and who:
(a) Has pled guilty or been found guilty, or been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 552.030 of a sexually violent offense; or
(b) Has been committed as a criminal sexual psychopath pursuant to section 632.475 and statutes in effect before August 13, 1980.”
Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, Chapter 980 – Sexually Violent Person Commitments, defines a Sexually Violent Person as a “person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or illness, and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it likely that the person will engage in one or more acts of sexual violence.”
Indiana
In Indiana, Code 38-38-1-7.5, defines a Sexually Violent Predator as a “person who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to repeatedly commit a sex offense.”
Sexually Violent Predator Landmark Cases
Kansas v. Hendricks (US Supreme Court, 1997) – set forth procedures for the indefinite civil commitment of prisoners convicted of a sexual offense whom the state deems dangerous due to a mental abnormality.
The Supreme Court held:
1. The Act’s definition of “mental abnormality” satisfies “substantive” due process requirements. An individual’s constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26). This Court has consistently upheld involuntary commitment statutes that detain people who are unable to control their behavior and thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety, provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards (Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80. The Act unambiguously requires a precommitment finding of dangerousness either to one’s self or to others, and links that finding to a determination that the person suffers from a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder.” Generally, this Court has sustained a commitment statute if it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor, such as a “mental illness” or “mental abnormality,” see e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-315, for these additional requirements serve to limit confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. The Act sets forth comparable criteria with its precommitment requirement of “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder.” Contrary to Hendricks’ argument, this Court has never required States to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes and leaves to the States the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal significance (Cf. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365, n. 13. The legislature is therefore not required to use the specific term “mental illness” and is free to adopt any similar term. Pp. 8-13.
2. The Act does not violate the Constitution’s double jeopardy prohibition or its ban on ex post-facto lawmaking. Pp. 13-24.
(a) The Act does not establish criminal proceedings, and involuntary confinement under it is not punishment. The categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or criminal is a question of statutory construction (Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S., 364, 368). Nothing on the face of the Act suggests that the Kansas Legislature sought to create anything other than a civil commitment scheme. That manifest intent will be rejected only if Hendricks provides the clearest proof that the scheme is so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate Kansas’ intention to deem it civil (United States v. Ward, 448 U.s. 242, 248-249). He has failed to satisfy this heavy burden. Commitment under the Act does not implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence. Its purpose is not retributive: It does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct, but uses such conduct solely for evidentiary purposes; it does not make criminal conviction a prerequisite for commitment; and it lacks a scienter requirement, an important element in distinguishing criminal and civil statutes. Nor can the Act be said to act as a deterrent, since persons with a mental abnormality or personality disorder are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement. The conditions surrounding confinement–essentially the same as conditions for any civilly committed patient–do not suggest a punitive purpose. Although the commitment scheme here involves an affirmative restraint, such restraint of the dangerously mentally ill has been historically regarded as a legitimate nonpunitive objective (Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747. The confinement’s potentially indefinite duration is linked, not to any punitive objective, but to the purpose of holding a person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others. He is thus permitted immediate release upon a showing that he is no longer dangerous, and the longest he can be detained pursuant to a single judicial proceeding is one year. The State’s use of procedural safeguards applicable in criminal trials does not itself turn the proceedings into criminal prosecution (Allen, supra, at 372). Finally, the Act is not necessarily punitive if it fails to offer treatment where treatment for a condition is not possible, or if treatment, though possible, is merely an ancillary, rather than an overriding, state concern. The conclusion that the Act is nonpunitive removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post-facto claims. Pp. 13-21.
(b) Hendricks’ confinement does not amount to a second prosecution and punishment for the offense for which he was convicted. Because the Act is civil in nature, its commitment proceedings do not constitute a second prosecution. Cf. Jones, supra. As this commitment is not tantamount to punishment, the detention does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though it follows a prison term (Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107. Hendricks’ argument that, even if the Act survives the “multiple punishments” test, it fails the “same elements” test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, is rejected, since that test does not apply outside of the successive prosecution context. Pp. 22-23.
(c) Hendricks’ ex post-facto claim is similarly flawed. The Ex Post-Facto Clause pertains exclusively to penal statutes. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505. Since the Act is not punishment, its application does not raise ex post-facto concerns. Moreover, the Act clearly does not have retroactive effect. It does not criminalize conduct legal before its enactment or deprive Hendricks of any defense that was available to him at the time of his crimes. Pp. 23-24.
